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Abstract 
Recent research suggests that when people retrieve information from memory they 
tend to fixate on the location where the information had appeared during encoding. We used 
this phenomenon to investigate if different information is activated in memory when people 
use a rule- versus a similarity-based decision strategy. In two studies, participants first 
memorized multiple pieces of information about various job candidates (exemplars). In 
subsequent test trials they judged the suitability of new candidates that varied in their 
similarity to the previously learned exemplars. Results show that when using similarity, but 
not when using a rule, participants fixated longer on the previous location of exemplars that 
resembled the new candidates than on the location of dissimilar exemplars. This suggests that 
people using similarity retrieve previously learned exemplars, whereas people using a rule do 
not. The study illustrates that eye movements can provide new insights into the memory 
processes underlying decision making. 
 
Keywords: similarity, eye movements, process tracing, looking-at-nothing, multi-cue 
decision making, episodic memory 
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1. Introduction 
A fundamental distinction in cognitive psychology refers to the contrast between 
similarity- and rule-based cognitive processes. Although this distinction is intuitively 
appealing and has stimulated much empirical research, it has proved difficult to pin down on 
the process level (e.g., Barsalou, 1990; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Milton, Wills, & Hodgson, 
2009; Pothos, 2005). One reason could be the core difference between rule-based and 
similarity-based processes in how information is processed in memory (Hahn & Chater, 
1998). This makes the differences between similarity- and rule-based processes difficult to 
study, because memory processes are invisible. For instance, when studying decision 
processes it is easy to observe what people chose, but not whether people made a choice by 
focusing on the information provided or by retrieving similar decisions from memory. Recent 
research has suggested that eye movements can be used to trace information search in 
memory (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2010, 2012; Richardson & Kirkham, 
2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000); we show in the present work that recording eye 
movements can be used to make differences in memory retrieval between people using 
similarity- and rule-based strategies visible, providing a possible method for disentangling the 
two strategies on the process level. 
1.1. Using Eye Movements to Make Information Search in Memory Visible 
Studying cognitive processes that rely on memory, such as categorization, reasoning, 
problem solving, and decision making, can be challenging because the processes of interest 
are not directly observable. Researchers have tackled this problem by developing indirect 
methods, using self-reports, computational modeling, and reaction times to gain a window 
into the mind (Anderson, 1987; Bröder, 2000; Johnson & Krems, 2001; Lewandowsky & 
Farrell, 2011; Mehlhorn, Taatgen, Lebiere, & Krems, 2011; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1993). Although these methods provide valuable data, they also have important drawbacks. 
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For instance, self-reports about memory processes are often inaccurate and incomplete, and 
asking about them can affect the process itself (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Renkewitz & Jahn, 
2010; Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989).  
Alternatively, eye movements can be used to trace information search (Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011; Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013; Peterson & Beck, 2011). Eye movements 
are quick, frequent, and highly automatic actions (Irwin, 2004; Rayner, 2009; Spivey & Dale, 
2011; van Gompel, Fischer, Murray, & Hill, 2007) that have been shown to reflect attention 
and information search in a variety of tasks, such as concept learning (Nelson & Cottrell, 
2007; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005), text comprehension (Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 
1998; Altmann, 2004; Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & 
Sedivy, 1995), and decision making (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Orquin & Mueller Loose, 
2013). Lately, evidence has been accumulating that eye movements can also be used to trace 
memory processes. When people retrieve information from memory they look at spatial 
locations where the information was originally presented—even if the information is no 
longer visible (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; Johansson, Holsanova, Dewhurst, & Holmqvist, 
2012; Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006; Laeng, Bloem, D’Ascenzo, & Tommasi, 
2014; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Martarelli & Mast, 2013; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; 
Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2001). In the classic paradigm, Richardson and 
Spivey (2000) presented participants with a spinning cross in one of four equal-sized areas on 
a computer screen together with spoken factual information. In a later test phase, participants 
heard a statement regarding the presented facts and had to judge the truth of the statement. 
Even though during this retrieval phase the computer screen was blank, participants fixated 
more often on the spatial area where the sought-after information had been presented than on 
the other three areas on the screen.  
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Most likely, people show this ―looking at nothing‖ effect because during encoding, 
information from multiple sources of input, including the locations of perceived objects, is 
integrated into an episodic memory representation. Once the episodic memory representation 
is reactivated during retrieval it spreads activation to the motor system, which in turn leads to 
the execution of eye movements back to the locations linked with the memory representation 
(Huettig, Mishra, & Olivers, 2012; Huettig, Olivers, & Hartsuiker, 2011; Richardson & 
Kirkham, 2004). The exact role eye movements play in the retrieval process is still debated 
(e.g., Ferreira, Apel, & Henderson, 2008; Richardson, Altmann, Spivey, & Hoover, 2009), 
but early evidence suggests that eye movements can also facilitate memory retrieval 
(Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014). 
Recent research suggests that the looking-at-nothing effect can also be used to trace 
retrieval processes in higher order cognitive processes such as decision making and 
diagnostic reasoning. For instance, Renkewitz and Jahn (2010, 2012) found that when 
participants had to retrieve information about two alternatives to make a decision, they looked 
at the location where the information about the alternatives had previously appeared. 
Furthermore, gaze patterns during retrieval were consistent with the information search 
predicted by the decision strategies participants used. Similarly, Jahn and Braatz (2014) 
showed that during a diagnostic reasoning task, people tended to look at locations associated 
with symptoms they had to retrieve from memory to test hypotheses about what caused the 
symptom. More importantly, the eye movements reflected the diagnostic value of the 
symptoms and how participants updated their hypotheses about the causes over time. These 
findings suggest that eye movements are not automatically launched to all associated spatial 
locations but reflect target-oriented information search in memory during the reasoning 
process. 
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In sum, spatial information about the location of information is stored along with the 
memory of it. Retrieving the respective memory triggers eye movements to the associated 
locations. These eye movements reflect the currently active memory representation and 
provide researchers with a new method for monitoring information search in memory. We 
used this method to differentiate memory processes involved in similarity- and rule-based 
judgments and decisions.  
1.2. Memory Retrieval in Similarity- and Rule-based Processes 
The distinction between rule- and similarity-based processes is fundamental to 
understanding human cognition and has stimulated research in a broad range of fields, from 
categorization and decision making (e.g., Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; 
Erickson et al., 1998; Persson & Rieskamp, 2009; Pothos & Hahn, 2000) to reasoning (Smith, 
Langston, & Nisbett, 1992) and language acquisition (Pinker & Prince, 1988). In general, it is 
assumed that rule-based processes involve the application of previously abstracted knowledge 
to specific instances (Hahn & Chater, 1998). That is, people form a rule defining the 
relationship between a specific piece of information and the decision outcome and apply it 
when confronted with a new decision problem (Bröder, Newell, & Platzer, 2010; Juslin, 
Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Küpper, 2012; Persson & 
Rieskamp, 2009; von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 
2009). For instance, when deciding to take one’s bike or car in the morning, one could have 
learned the rule that it is better to take the car when it is raining. In contrast, similarity 
processes are generally characterized by the retrieval of similar instances or exemplars from 
memory (Bröder et al., 2010; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Hahn, Prat-Sala, Pothos, & Brumby, 
2010; Juslin & Persson, 2002). That is, when deciding to take the car or the bike in the 
morning, one might think back to similar occasions and compare how well one fared when 
taking the bike. 
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A core theoretical distinction that has been proposed is that the two processes differ in 
the way mental representations of stored information are accessed (Bailey, 2005; Hahn & 
Chater, 1998). Similarity-based processes involve comparing the object under consideration 
to exemplars stored in memory. In contrast, rule-based processes involve processing the 
information an object under consideration provides according to the processing steps 
specified by the rule. Accordingly, in a decision task the object’s attributes are matched 
against the conditions for choosing the respective options as specified in the rule. This 
suggests that similarity-based but not rule-based processes require the retrieval of previously 
encountered instances from memory. Consistently, similarity-based judgments rely more on 
episodic memory than rule-based judgments (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, in 
press). However, direct evidence that similarity- and rule-based processes rely on different 
retrieval processes is scarce (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). One problem is that differentiating the 
two processes is far from trivial on a conceptual and empirical level (Barsalou, 1990; Hahn & 
Chater, 1998; Markman et al., 2005; Pothos, 2005). Research trying to tease apart rule- and 
similarity-based processes has frequently relied on computational modeling approaches (e.g., 
Bröder et al., 2010; Juslin et al., 2008; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; Karlsson, Juslin, & 
Olsson, 2007; Nosofsky & Bergert, 2007; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Persson & Rieskamp, 
2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen, Karlsson, Mata, & Wilke, 2013; von Helversen 
et al., 2010). Although computational modeling approaches can provide relevant insights into 
the cognitive processes underlying behavior, there are important limitations. First, the 
decision of which model best describes the data is usually based on some measure of 
goodness of fit. However, depending on the selected measure the results may diverge 
considerably (Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2013). Furthermore, just because a 
model can predict the outcome of a decision process does not necessarily mean it also reflects 
the underlying cognitive processes. Indeed, looking at process data may reveal that a model 
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misses important aspects of the cognitive processes leading to the decision (e.g., Johnson, 
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Willemsen, 2008). Accordingly, it seems necessary to complement 
cognitive modeling approaches with process data to reach a full understanding of the 
cognitive processes underlying a decision (see also Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, & 
Ranyard, 2011). 
We used the looking-at-nothing effect to clarify how memory processes involved in 
similarity- and rule-based decisions differ. Specifically, if rule and similarity processes differ 
in the information that is retrieved from memory when making a decision, it should be 
possible to make these search processes visible by associating exemplars with specific spatial 
locations and then tracking the eye movements during the retrieval process to capture 
information search in memory. If people retrieve exemplars from memory when relying on a 
similarity-based process, the looking-at-nothing effect would predict that people gaze back at 
associated exemplar locations. In contrast, if people do not retrieve similar exemplars from 
memory when using a rule, fixation on the locations associated with exemplars should be 
rare. Furthermore, when using an exemplar-based strategy the eye movements to exemplar 
locations should be a function of the exemplars’ similarity, because the probability with 
which an exemplar is retrieved from memory depends on the exemplar’s similarity to the 
object under evaluation (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999, Hintzman, 1988; Nosofsky & 
Palmeri, 1997).  
To test these hypotheses, we conducted two experiments using a multi-cue decision 
paradigm. We chose this type of problem because the assumption that people rely on rule- 
and similarity-based strategies to make decisions is widespread (Bröder et al., 2010; Hahn et 
al., 2010; Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Persson & 
Rieskamp, 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen et al., 2010, 2013).  
2. Study 1 
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Study 1 examined if relying on a rule versus relying on similarity leads to different 
information retrieval from memory. Participants had to decide if job candidates applying for a 
position were suitable, that is, whether they should be invited for an interview or rejected. In 
a training phase participants learned information about two suitable and two unsuitable job 
candidates. In a subsequent test phase they were instructed to decide if new job candidates 
should be invited, either by using a rule that was provided to them or by using similarity to 
the previously learned job candidates (exemplars). To study eye movements, the information 
about the four exemplars was presented in four different locations on the screen during the 
training phase. During the test phase we used the eye movements to the exemplar locations to 
measure memory retrieval. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
We included participants in the experiment only if the tracking validity reached a 
visual angle smaller than 2°. This was the case for 63 participants. From the 63, we excluded 
10 participants from the analyses, 5 because they did not decide according to the instructed 
strategy and 5 because in the majority of trials less than 60% of eye movement data was 
recorded (see Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012, for a similar procedure). The final 53 participants 
were all students from Technische Universität Chemnitz (34 female; Mage = 22.4 years, range 
18–31 years). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision with glasses or contact lenses. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the different strategy conditions, 27 to the rule 
condition and 26 to the similarity condition. For their participation they received course credit 
and a performance-dependent bonus (M = 4.80 euros). On average, the experiment lasted 60 
min.  
2.1.2. Apparatus  
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Participants were seated in front of a 22-inch computer screen (resolution: 1,680 × 
1,050 pixels) at a distance of 630 mm and instructed to position their head in a chin rest. 
Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 running on a separate computer. The eye tracker 
system SMI iView RED120 sampled data of the right eye at 120 Hz and recorded with iView 
X 2.5 following a 5-point calibration. Auditory material was presented via headphones. All 
auditory recordings were spoken by a female voice using a shell script in Mac OSx. 
Participants responded by pressing one of two keys on a standard keyboard or with mouse 
clicks on cue values. Data were analyzed with BeGaze 2.3. Fixation detection followed a 
dispersion threshold of 2° of visual angle and a duration threshold of 100 msec. 
2.1.3. Decision Task 
In the decision task, participants decided to invite job candidates for an interview or 
reject them based on information on three attribute dimensions (i.e., cues). The decision task 
consisted of three phases: a memorization phase, a strategy-learning phase, and a test phase 
(see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the three phases in Study 1. Participants started 
with the memorization phase in which they had to learn the information about the four 
learning candidates. The candidates appeared in four rectangles in the upper two-thirds of the 
screen. Note for the figure we increased the size of the boxes in the memorization phase to 
enhance readability. The actual distribution of the learning candidates’ locations on the screen 
is reflected in the illustrations of the strategy learning and the test phase. In the study all cue 
information was written in the same font size. During the strategy-learning phase participants 
decided whether to invite the learning candidates for an interview following either a rule-
based or a similarity-based strategy. Participants were told which training candidate they 
were evaluating in each trial via headphones. During the decision, the rectangles within 
which the information on the four candidates had appeared were visible but empty. In 
addition, a bottom rectangle appeared that contained information about the strategy 
participants should use. During the test phase, all rectangles remained visible but did not 
contain any information. The information about the test candidates participants evaluated was 
provided via headphones. Original materials were in German.  
 
2.1.3.1. Memorization phase 
During the memorization phase participants memorized information about four male 
―learning‖ candidates (candidates used in the memorization and strategy-learning phases). 
For each learning candidate participants learned the candidate’s name, his values on the three 
cues, and whether he had been invited to an interview. The three cues were knowledge of a 
foreign language (with cue values French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish), possession of 
computer skills (with cue values HTML, Photoshop, SPSS, and SQL), and previous work 
experience (with cue values automobile industry, financial sector, mobile phone industry, and 
pharmaceutical industry). Names of the learning (and test) candidates were taken from an 
online resource for popular first names (http://www.beliebte-vornamen.de). Each learning 
candidate had a unique combination of cue values (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). Two of 
the learning candidates were suitable (i.e., had been invited) and two were unsuitable (i.e., 
had been rejected). Each of the four learning candidates was associated with a different 
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spatial area located in the upper two-thirds of the screen and at an equal distance from the 
center of the screen (see Figure 1). The candidate’s name always appeared on top followed by 
the cue values and the suitability information (whether the candidate had been invited or 
rejected). Cue values and suitability information appeared as single words in four rectangles. 
Positions of learning candidates and the order of the cue values were randomized across 
participants with the constraint that the two invited learning candidates were always located 
at the same side of the screen, that is, both were on either the right or the left half of the 
screen. For a given participant, the order of the cues was the same for all learning candidates 
(e.g., for the same participant the cue ―language‖ appeared in the second rectangle for all 
learning candidates). 
To learn the names, cue values, and suitability of the four learning candidates, 
participants first saw all the information about the four learning candidates in the rectangles 
on the screen and could study it. Once they had studied the information they could click on 
―continue‖ and all the information disappeared. Then the name of one of the learning 
candidates appeared on the screen and participants had to fill in the correct information for 
this candidate. They could do so by selecting the correct cue value from a table presented at 
the bottom of the screen. If they selected the correct information it was highlighted in green 
and appeared in the corresponding rectangle of the learning candidate where it remained 
visible for the rest of the trial. If they selected incorrect information, it was highlighted in red. 
In addition, the correct information was highlighted in green and appeared in the rectangle. 
Participants always filled in cue information for the learning candidates from top to bottom. 
After reproducing all the information for a learning candidate, the complete information was 
visible on the screen and was auditorily presented to the participant over the headphones. 
Then the name of the next learning candidate appeared and the candidate’s cue information 
had to be filled in. After participants filled in the information for all four learning candidates 
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they received feedback about the percentage of correct decisions that had been made and a 
new cycle began. The sequence in which they had to reproduce the information for the four 
learning candidates was randomized within a cycle. This procedure was repeated until the 
participants correctly reproduced the information for all four learning candidates twice. 
Participant got a bonus of 1 euro if they finished learning within 40 cycles (e.g., each learning 
applicant would be presented 40 times).  
2.1.3.2. Strategy-learning phase 
In the strategy-learning phase, half of the participants were instructed to use a rule to 
decide if a candidate should be invited and the other half were instructed to decide according 
to similarity. In the rule condition participants were instructed to invite a job candidate if at 
least two of the three cues had a positive value. Positive values for each cue were (1) 
knowledge of French or Italian, (2) knowledge of HTML or SQL, and (3) experience in the 
financial sector or the mobile phone industry. For instance, according to this rule a candidate 
should be invited if he speaks French, has knowledge of HTML, and has experience in the 
automobile industry. However, a candidate should be rejected if he speaks French, has 
knowledge of SPSS, and is experienced in the automobile industry. Participants in the 
similarity condition were instructed to invite a candidate if he had more cue values in 
common with the learning candidates who had been invited than with the learning candidates 
who had not been invited. Participants were informed that they would need to use the strategy 
to evaluate the candidates in the test phase and that they could practice using the strategy by 
relating the strategy’s predictions to the cue information for the learning candidates. During 
the strategy-learning phase a shortened version of the strategy instructions was presented in a 
fifth spatial area at the bottom of the screen located at the same distance from the center as 
the areas of the learning candidates (see Figure 1). The visual layout of the rectangles in 
which the strategy instructions were presented was the same as for the information about the 
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learning candidates. With the exception of these different instructions, the strategy-learning 
phase followed the same procedure in both conditions: The name of one of the learning 
candidates was presented via headphones and the participants had to decide if he should be 
invited according to the instructed strategy by retrieving the information about the learning 
candidate from memory. To make the decision, participants had to press one of two keys on 
the keyboard. After pressing the key they got visual feedback in the center of the screen about 
whether their decision was correct or wrong. If the decision was correct a green rectangle 
appeared in the middle of the screen stating: ―This decision is correct. The candidate is 
invited/ rejected.‖ In case of a wrong decision a red rectangle appeared stating ―This decision 
is wrong. The candidate is invited/ rejected.‖ In addition, the cue information of the judged 
learning exemplar became visible in the corresponding spatial area and was auditorily 
repeated to the participants. Then the next trial started. Strategy learning ended when 
participants had correctly judged the suitability of all four learning candidates within one 
cycle.  
To check if participants had learned the strategies, we asked them at the end of the 
strategy-learning phase to reproduce the cue values that would allow them to invite a 
candidate for an interview. For this all possible cue values were presented onscreen in a table, 
with the cue values of each cue in one row. Participants had to click on the respective cue 
values. In the rule condition they had to reproduce the cue values that would allow invitation. 
In the similarity condition they had to reproduce the cue values of the similar invited learning 
candidates.  
2.1.3.3. Test phase 
To check if participants had understood how to apply the learned strategy to new 
candidates, they solved one practice trial at the beginning of the test phase, where they had to 
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judge a new candidate, and received feedback about the correctness of their choice. During 
subsequent trials no feedback was given.  
During the test phase, participants judged the suitability of 20 test candidates. Four of 
them had cue values identical to those of the learning candidates but had different names. The 
remaining 16 candidates were new candidates who differed in their similarity to the invited 
and rejected learning candidates. We constructed the test candidates so that they shared n = 0, 
1, 2, or 3 cue values with the two invited learning candidates and shared 3−n cue values with 
the rejected candidates. Thus, a candidate who shared no cue values with the invited learning 
candidates automatically shared three cue values with the rejected learning candidates, and so 
on. Details on the task structure can be found in the Appendix, Table A.1.  
At the beginning of each trial, participants had to fixate on the center of the screen (2 
s). Subsequently, the name and cue values of one candidate were presented auditorily over the 
headphones (6 s) and participants had to decide whether to invite them for an interview by 
pressing one of two keys on the keyboard (self-paced). While the information was presented 
participants saw only the empty rectangles in the spatial areas where cue and strategy 
information had been presented during the memorization and strategy-learning phases. For 
each correct judgment, participants were paid a bonus of 20 cents.  
2.2. Results 
2.2.1. Performance 
Participants memorized the information about the learning candidates rather quickly. 
On average they reached the learning criterion in 3.2 cycles (SD = 1.3). They also performed 
well during strategy training: On average, they correctly classified all learning candidates 
according to the strategy in 1.3 cycles (SD = 0.6). Participants in the two strategy conditions 
(rule, similarity) were equally fast in memorizing the information, Mrule = 3.3, SD = 1.5, Msim 
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= 2.9, SD = 1, t(45.2) = 1.15, p = .26, d = .34, and learning the strategy, Mrule = 1.2, SD = 0.5, 
Msim = 1.4, SD = 0.8, t(42.4) = 1.14, p = .26, d = .36. 
In the test phase, we measured accuracy as the percentage of decisions that were in 
line with the instructed strategy. Accuracy was high and did not differ between the 
conditions, Mrule = 94.3, SD = 8.7 and Msim = 96.5, SD = 5.8, t(51) = 1.12, p = .27, d = .32.  
Response times were measured from the beginning of the auditory information 
presentation during a test trial until participants’ response. On average participants in the rule 
condition, Mrule = 9.6 s, SD = 0.6, took as long as participants in the similarity condition, Msim 
= 9.2 s, SD = 1, t(51) = 1.54, p = .13, d = .43.  
2.2.2. Analyses of Fixations 
To assess differences in gaze behavior between the strategy conditions we excluded 
all trials in which the dwell criterion (at least 60% of the eye movements were recorded) was 
not met on the trial level, which led to the exclusion of 70 trials (6.6% of all trials). We then 
defined rectangular areas of interest (AOIs) around the location of each learning candidate 
(exemplar locations) and the instruction location. All AOIs were of the same size (8° by 8° of 
visual angle). These nonoverlapping AOIs exceeded the exemplar locations by 2.7° of visual 
angle in the horizontal direction and 1.8° of visual angle in the vertical direction. For each 
trial, we determined the sum of fixation durations at each of the five AOIs. Fixations on other 
areas were ignored. F values in statistical analyses were Greenhouse–Geisser corrected when 
necessary. We report the analyses separately for the test candidates who were only similar to 
the learning candidates and the test candidates who had cue profiles that were identical to the 
learning candidates’ because different memory processes could be involved. 
2.2.2.1. Mean fixation durations for identical test items  
In a first step we analyzed only those test items that had an identical cue profile to that 
of the learning candidates. Following the looking-at-nothing literature, we assumed that if 
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people retrieve exemplars from memory, they should gaze back at the location associated 
with the learned exemplar when listening to a test item with an identical cue profile. To test 
this assumption, we calculated the fixation durations for the five AOIs in the trials in which 
the four identical test candidates were presented. We then tested how long participants gazed 
on average at the AOI that contained the identical learning exemplars relative to the other 
four AOIs. For this we coded the exemplar location that had contained the learning candidate 
with an identical cue profile to that of the test candidate as ―match location‖. The exemplar 
location that had contained the second invited or rejected learning candidate was coded as 
―mismatch 1 location‖. The remaining exemplar locations were coded as mismatch 2 and 
mismatch 3 from left to right. The location containing the instruction during strategy learning 
was coded as ―instruction location‖. A mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the within-
subject factor exemplar location (match, mismatch 1, mismatch 2, mismatch 3, instruction) 
and the between-subjects factor strategy condition (rule or similarity) revealed main effects of 
exemplar location, F(2.5, 127.1) = 5.36, p = .003, p
2
 = .10, and strategy condition, F(1, 51) = 
13.77, p = .001, p
2
 = .21, and a significant interaction, indicating that the pattern of eye 
movements differed between the conditions, F(2.5, 127.1) = 4.02, p = .013, p
2
 = .08. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, participants fixated on the four exemplar locations and the instruction 
location equally long in the rule condition, F(2.4, 63.3) = 1.40, p = .254, p
2
 = .05. In 
contrast, in the similarity condition the gaze duration depended on the location, F(2.4, 60.6) = 
5.19, p = .005, p
2
 = .17. Participants fixated longer on the match location than on the other 
exemplar locations (Bonferroni-corrected post hoc contrasts, all ps < .03). Participants also 
fixated longer on the match location than on the instruction location. However, this post-hoc 
contrast did not reach significance (p = .22). Additionally, participants in the similarity 
condition fixated on the match location longer than participants in the rule condition, t(32.1) 
= 4.12, p < .001, d = 1.45.  
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Figure 2. Mean duration of fixation on the five areas of interest (AOIs) in the rule as 
compared to the similarity condition. The first location marks the exemplar location that 
contained the learning candidate whose cue profile was identical to the respective test 
candidate’s (match). The second, third, and fourth locations refer to the other three exemplar 
locations (mismatch 1, mismatch 2, mismatch 3). The fifth location refers to the location of 
the instructions (instruction). Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
2.2.2.2. Mean fixation durations as a function of item similarity 
In a second step we analyzed if the duration of fixation on the exemplar locations 
differed as a function of the similarity to the learning candidates when evaluating new test 
candidates who did not have identical cue profiles to those of the learning candidates (see 
Appendix, Table A.1). We first calculated for each participant the mean duration of fixation 
on the locations of the invited learning candidates, the rejected learning candidates, and the 
instructions in each trial. Then we calculated for each participant the mean fixation durations 
for the test candidates who had 0, 1, 2, or 3 cue values in common with the invited learning 
candidates (and 3, 2, 1, and 0 values in common with the rejected learning candidates, 
respectively). We then tested if the mean duration of fixation on the locations of the invited 
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and rejected learning candidates varied as a function of similarity (i.e., the number of shared 
cue values) in the two strategy conditions. For this we ran a mixed ANOVA on the fixation 
durations with the two within-subject factors similarity (0, 1, 2, 3) and exemplar type (invited 
vs. rejected) and the between-subjects factor strategy condition (rule vs. similarity). Overall, 
participants in the similarity condition fixated on the exemplar locations longer than 
participants in the rule condition, as shown by a main effect of strategy condition, F(1, 51) = 
16.32, p < .001, p
2
 = .24. Furthermore, significant interactions between similarity and 
exemplar type, F(4.3, 216.7) = 8.36, p < .001, p
2
 = .14, and similarity, strategy condition, 
and exemplar type, F(4.3, 216.7) = 8.09, p < .001, p
2
 = .14, suggested that the effect of 
similarity differed by strategy condition and exemplar type. As illustrated in Figure 3, when 
we analyzed the two strategy conditions separately we found that in the rule condition, 
fixation durations did not differ by similarity. Neither the main effect of similarity, F(3, 78) = 
0.92, p = .44, p
2
 = .03, nor the interaction between similarity and exemplar type, F(3.4, 87.4) 
= 1.14, p = .34, p
2
 = .04, was significant. In contrast, in the similarity condition, participants’ 
gaze varied according to similarity, as shown by a significant interaction of similarity and 
exemplar type, F(3.3, 82.3) = 10.1, p < .001, p
2
 = .29. Indeed, the more cue values a test 
candidate shared with the invited learning candidates the more participants gazed at invited 
candidates and the less they gazed at rejected candidates [linear contrast for the invited 
candidates: F(1, 25) = 17.84, p < .001, p
2
 = .42]. In turn, the more similar the test candidates 
were to rejected learning candidates, the more participants gazed at rejected candidates and 
the less they gazed at invited candidates [linear contrast rejected candidates: F(1, 25) = 19.90, 
p < .001, p
2
 = .44]. 
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Figure 3. Mean duration of fixation for exemplar locations of invited and rejected 
candidates and the instruction location in the rule condition (left) and the similarity condition 
(right). Exemplar location refers to the number of shared cue values with invited learning 
candidates ranging from 0 to 3. The similarity to the rejected candidates is the opposite of the 
similarity to the invited ones. Thus a similarity to the invited candidates of 0 corresponds to a 
similarity of 3 to the rejected ones, and so on. Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
2.3. Discussion of Study 1 
In Study 1 we investigated whether the gaze patterns of participants differ when using 
a rule-based or a similarity-based decision strategy. Taking into account the finding that when 
retrieving information from memory people look back at the location where the information 
previously appeared (e.g. Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000), we 
hypothesized that participants’ gaze patterns should reflect whether they retrieved the learned 
exemplars from memory. In line with this hypothesis, we found that when instructed to use a 
rule, participants did not look back at the locations associated with learning candidates. In 
contrast, when participants were instructed to make decisions based on the similarity to the 
learned candidates they looked back at the locations of similar exemplars. These results 
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provide empirical evidence that people retrieve different information from memory when 
instructed to use a rule- or similarity-based strategy and resonate with the idea that similarity- 
and rule-based processes differ in how memory representations are accessed (e.g., Bailey, 
2005; Hahn & Chater, 1998).  
The results are in line with research suggesting that eye movements to locations where 
information had previously appeared reflect memory retrieval processes (Jahn & Braatz, 
2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012) and show that the looking-at-nothing effect not only appears 
when previously seen exemplars are evaluated but also reflects memory retrieval in response 
to new information. However, although we found that people looked back at the locations of 
the previously learned exemplars, we did not find a looking-at-nothing effect for the 
instruction location in either the rule or the similarity condition. Possibly, the strategy-
learning phase was too short to build up a reliable association between the instruction location 
and episodic memory traces of the strategy. Alternatively, it is possible that the strategy 
instruction was kept activated during the complete test phase, making retrieval unnecessary.  
The goal of the first study was to show that differences in information search in 
memory can be observed by tracking eye movements during the decision process. We 
instructed participants to use a rule- or similarity-based strategy—thus ensuring that 
participants indeed relied on the cognitive process of interest. Based on the first study, 
however, we cannot tell if the same memory retrieval processes would occur when people 
spontaneously use a similarity- or rule-based strategy. An explicit instruction to use a strategy 
induces a deliberate and controlled strategy execution, which could result in different 
cognitive processes from those that would occur for spontaneous strategy application. In 
particular, the cognitive processes involved when spontaneously using a similarity-based 
strategy could differ from a controlled application of similarity, because similarity-based 
strategies are often thought to be of an implicit and automatic nature (Ashby et al., 1998; 
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Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013; but see Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008). In 
addition, the explicit rule instruction could have impeded retrieval processes that can appear 
when participants spontaneously rely on a decision rule but not if they deliberately use the 
rule. Thus, to go one step further and to investigate if the same gaze patterns can be observed 
when participants spontaneously rely on a rule- or a similarity-based strategy, we conducted a 
second study in which we did not instruct participants to rely on a specific strategy but aimed 
to manipulate strategy use implicitly through the task structure.  
3. Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was to test if information retrieval from memory also differs 
between rule-based and similarity-based decision strategies when the strategy is employed 
spontaneously. To be able to compare explicit and spontaneous strategy use we investigated 
the eye movements related to memory processes when strategies are spontaneously employed 
and when explicit instructions are given to use a specific strategy.  
Research in categorization, judgment, and decision making based on cognitive 
modeling suggests that the accuracy of strategies and the ease with which a strategy can be 
employed exert a strong influence on strategy selection (Bröder et al., 2010; Hoffmann et al., 
2013; Hoffmann et al., in press; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006; von Helversen et al., 2013). Specifically, people have been found to rely on 
rules as long as rules allow the task to be solved and can be easily applied—which is usually 
the case with one-dimensional rules. However, when the task cannot be solved by (simple) 
rules, people frequently switch to a similarity-based strategy (Ashby et al., 1998; Ashby & 
Maddox, 2005; Erickson et al., 1998; Hoffmann et al., in press; Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofsky 
& Palmeri, 1998; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; von Helversen et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, we created two conditions, one in which the decision task could be solved by a 
simple, one-dimensional rule and the other in which the decision task could only be solved by 
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memorizing the exemplars. In the first condition participants should recognize the rule and 
rely on a rule-based decision process, whereas in the second condition people should realize 
that the task cannot be solved by a rule and switch to a similarity-based strategy. We included 
two test phases. In the first participants could spontaneously choose how to solve the task; in 
the second phase we instructed them to follow a rule- or similarity-based strategy. 
3.1. Method 
Overall, we used a very similar decision task to that in Study 1. Again, participants 
had to decide whether to invite job candidates for an interview based on three cues. However, 
to be better able to induce strategy selection through task structure, we increased the number 
of learning exemplars to eight and adapted the strategy-learning phase to encourage a 
spontaneous use of the strategies. We recorded participants’ eye movements during the two 
test phases (spontaneous, instructed). 
3.1.1. Participants 
Fifty-seven people met the validity criterion. We excluded three of them from the 
analysis, one for not finishing the memorization phase within 1.5 h and two because in the 
majority of trials less than 60% of eye movement data was recorded, resulting in a final 
sample of 54 participants. The majority of the participants were students from the University 
of Basel (32 female; Mage = 27.7 years, range 18–51 years). Participants took part for course 
credit or financial compensation [16 Swiss francs (CHF) per hour]. In addition, they could 
earn a bonus depending on their performance in the learning and test phases (M = 5.1 CHF). 
All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision with glasses or contact lenses. Participants were 
randomly assigned, 26 to the rule condition and 28 to the similarity condition. On average, 
the experiment lasted 90 min.  
3.1.2. Apparatus 
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The same setup as in Study 1 was implemented at the University of Basel. Participants 
were seated in front of a 22-inch computer screen and the eye tracker system SMI iView 
RED120 sampled data of the right eye at 120 Hz. Auditory materials were presented via 
loudspeakers. Fixation detection followed a dispersion threshold of 2° of visual angle and a 
duration threshold of 100 msec. 
3.1.3. Decision Task 
We used the same procedure and materials as in Study 1 with some adaptations to 
induce participants to use either a rule or similarity without instructing them to do so. This 
time the study consisted of four phases: a memorization phase, a strategy-learning phase, and 
two test phases. In addition, we probed participants’ memory of learning candidates’ cue 
values at the end. 
3.1.3.1. Memorization phase 
During the memorization phase, participants had to learn the cue values and names of 
eight learning candidates by heart. We increased the number of learning candidates to be 
better able to induce using a rule or similarity via the task structure and outcome feedback. In 
contrast to Study 1, where each cue value was unique to a learning candidate, in Study 2 each 
cue value was associated with two learning candidates. The complete task structure can be 
found in the Appendix, Table A.2. As in Study 1, each of the eight learning candidates was 
presented at a different spatial location on the screen that was equidistant from the center and 
from the neighboring learning candidates (see Figure 4). In contrast to Study 1, we kept the 
order of the cues constant for all participants, starting with work experience and following 
with possession of computer skills and knowledge of a foreign language. In addition, 
participants did not learn about the suitability of the learning candidate (i.e., whether the 
candidate was invited to an interview) during the memorization phase. Presentation and test 
of cue values followed the same procedure as in Study 1. 
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Figure 4. Visual layout during both test phases of Study 2. During the tests only the 
empty rectangles were visible.  
 
3.1.3.2. Strategy-learning phase 
During the strategy-learning phase, participants were informed that they had to learn 
how to decide which candidates should be invited to an interview and that the knowledge 
they gained during the strategy-learning phase would be necessary to perform the task 
accurately in the subsequent test phases. Participants could learn to make the decisions based 
on trial-by-trial outcome feedback. In each trial, participants first fixated on a fixation cross at 
the center of the screen for 2 s. They then saw a screen containing only the empty rectangles 
where the learning exemplars had appeared during the memorization phase and heard the 
name of one of the learning candidates. Then, they had to decide whether they would invite 
him by pressing one of two keys. After their response, participants got visual feedback on 
whether they had given the correct response, and the cue information for the judged learning 
candidate was presented visually and auditorily. The eight learning candidates were presented 
repeatedly in randomized order with all candidates shown before a new cycle started. Within 
one cycle the order of the learning candidates was randomized. Strategy learning continued 
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until the participants had correctly judged all learning exemplars in one cycle once or had 
completed 160 trials (i.e., 20 cycles). 
In each condition, four of the learning candidates were invited for an interview and 
four were rejected. In the rule condition, the task could be solved with a simple rule based on 
the foreign language cue: A candidate was invited if he spoke French or Italian but not if he 
spoke Spanish or Portuguese
1
. In the similarity condition, the task could not be solved by a 
rule but only by memorizing the unique cue profile of each learning candidate. Specifically, 
we selected which of the eight candidates were invited and which were rejected so that every 
cue value appeared once with an invited and once with a rejected learning candidate (see 
Appendix, Table A.2).  
Positions of learning candidates were balanced in two spatial layouts. In both layouts 
no more than two learning candidates who belonged to the same category (invited or rejected) 
appeared in adjacent spatial locations. In each strategy condition, half the participants were 
presented with one spatial layout and the other half with the second layout.  
3.1.3.3. Test Phases 1 and 2 
In the test phases, participants had to judge 28 test candidates twice, once in Test 
Phase 1 and once in Test Phase 2. Eight of them were the learning candidates. Additionally, 
20 new candidates were presented who shared 0 to 2 cue values with the learning candidates. 
As in Study 1, participants first saw the fixation cross in the center of the screen (2 s). Then 
they saw the blank screen (except for the empty rectangles) and listened to the name and cue 
information of a test candidate. After that, they decided if the candidate should be invited by 
pressing one of two keys. No feedback was given to the participants.  
                                                 
1
 This rule was rather simple for two reasons: First, it was based on dichotomous cue 
values of a single cue. Second, the cue values matched with Swiss participants’ prior 
knowledge about languages that are particularly applicable in Switzerland. 
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In Test Phase 1, participants were told to judge the test candidates according to their 
experience gained in the strategy-learning phase. After Test Phase 1, we asked participants to 
write down how they solved the judgment task, so we could check if they had indeed used 
different strategies in the two strategy conditions. In Test Phase 2, participants in the rule 
condition were instructed to invite participants who knew French or Italian (the same rule that 
was used to determine feedback in the strategy-learning phase) and participants in the 
similarity condition were instructed to invite test candidates if they shared more cue values 
with the invited than with the rejected learning candidates. 
3.1.3.4. Memory test 
After completing both test phases, participants were asked to retrieve the cue values of 
the learning candidates. Participants saw a blank screen containing empty rectangles and 
filled in cue values of the learning candidates one by one by choosing the appropriate value 
from a selection that was presented in the center of the screen. For each correct judgment, 
participants were paid a bonus of 10 cents.  
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Performance and Strategy Classification 
Participants were able to memorize the information on the eight learning candidates 
rather quickly and did not differ between conditions in the learning cycles they required, Mrule 
= 4.9, SD = 2.4, Msim = 4.8, SD = 1.9, t(52) = 0.10, p = .92, d = .03. There were only small 
differences in the amount of practice it took to complete the strategy-learning phase with 
participants in the rule condition needing somewhat fewer cycles than participants in the 
similarity condition, Mrule = 3.7, SD = 1.3, Msim = 5, SD = 3.8, t(52) = 1.82, p = .08, d = .50.  
In the test phases, we measured accuracy as the percentage of responses that were in 
line with the strategy that they learned during the strategy-learning phase. Overall, the 
accuracy was rather high in both conditions, Mrule = 91.5, SD = 11.5, Msim = 80.4, SD = 11. 
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We then checked if participants had used the intended strategy by classifying them as 
selecting a similarity- or a rule-based strategy based on their verbal reports after Test Phase 
1.
2
 Participants were classified into three categories by three independent raters: (1) Simple 
rule users: Participants mentioned one cue that they used to make a decision, for example, ―I 
concentrated on the cue foreign language. I invited candidates speaking French or Italian. I 
did not invite candidates speaking Spanish or Portuguese.‖ (2) Complex rule users: 
Participants mentioned two or more cues, for example, ―First I looked up language 
knowledge. If the candidate spoke French or Italian, I looked up other cues.‖ (3) Similarity 
users: Participants referred explicitly to using similarity to the learning candidates, for 
example, ―I tried to find the most similar learning candidate and decided [to invite or reject a 
test candidate] according to this learning candidate.‖ Overall, rater agreement was high. In the 
cases where the raters disagreed, the case was discussed until agreement was reached. In the 
rule feedback condition, 10 participants were classified as using a simple rule, 4 as using a 
complex rule, and 8 as using similarity. In the similarity feedback condition, no participant 
used a simple rule, 3 participants used a complex rule, and 18 participants used similarity. In 
four cases in the rule feedback condition and in three cases in the similarity feedback 
condition participants did not report a strategy or reported problems verbalizing the strategy 
they used. Similarity is often considered an implicit strategy, which can impair the ability to 
verbalize it (Ashby et al., 1998). For this reason we included these participants in the 
                                                 
2
 The adaptive learning criterion in the strategy-learning phase ensured that 
participants judged all eight learning candidates in line with the strategy feedback. However, 
in our task it was not possible to unambiguously determine the strategy a participant used 
purely based on the participants’ decisions. In particular, in the rule condition we cannot rule 
out based on the decisions that a participant solved the task by using the similarity of the test 
candidates to the learning candidates on the foreign language cue to make the decision. Thus, 
we used the verbal reports to determine strategy choices. 
Running Head: TRACK SIMILARITY 
 
 29 
similarity user category. To ensure that this did not influence the pattern of results, we 
additionally ran the analyses without these participants, which yielded the same pattern of 
results. We excluded four participants in the similarity condition because they reported using 
different strategies, such as responding by chance. Because participants differed in the 
strategies they selected in the two conditions, we used strategy classification as an additional 
factor in the following analyses. We excluded the three participants who were classified as 
rule users in the similarity condition from the analysis because the low number of rule users 
in this condition did not allow a statistical comparison. Descriptive statistics for the three rule 
users in the similarity condition and the four participants who reported using different 
strategies are included in the Appendix, Table A.3. 
We then compared accuracy in the two test phases depending on the strategy 
condition (rule or similarity) and strategy classification (see Table 1). In the rule condition in 
Test Phase 1, participants using similarity performed worse than participants using a rule, 
t(24) = 2.90, p = .008, d = 1.16. Participants using similarity in the rule condition improved 
from Test Phase 1 to 2, t(11) = 4.85, p = .001, d = 1.46, and in Test Phase 2 rule and 
similarity users were equally accurate, t(11.83) = 1.22, p = .245, d = .07.  
Similarity users in the similarity condition were as accurate as similarity users in the 
rule condition in Test Phase 1, t(31) = 0.042, p = .967, d = 0, but less accurate in Test Phase 
2, t(31) = 3.23, p = .003, d = .16. Similarity users in the similarity condition did not differ in 
terms of accuracy between Test Phase 1 and Test Phase 2, t(20) = 1.69, p = .106, d = .38.  
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Sample Size for Response Accuracy (%) in the Two Test 
Phases 
Test phase Strategy condition 
Rule Similarity 
M SD n M SD n 
1       
   Rule users  93 12.4 14 87.7 9 3 
   Similarity users 77.5 14.9 12 77.7 12 21 
2       
   Rule users 99 2.2 14 89.9 5.1 3 
   Similarity users 95.1 10.6 12 82.5 11 21 
 
As in Study 1, response times were measured from the beginning of the auditory 
information presentation until participants’ response in a test trial. In Test Phase 1 there were 
no differences in response times between the rule condition and the similarity condition, Mrule 
= 10.6 s, SD = 4.3, Msim = 11.2 s, SD = 3.6, t(28) = 0.53, p = .60, d = .10, nor between rule 
and similarity users, Mrule = 10.5 s, SD = 4.1, Msim = 11.2 s, SD = 3.9, t(48) = 0.60, p = .55, d 
= .17. In Test Phase 2 participants in the rule condition were faster than participants in the 
similarity condition, Mrule = 8.8 s, SD = 0.4, Msim = 10.8 s, SD = 2.3, t(28.8) = 4.52, p < .001, 
d = 1.68. Performance in the memory test at the end of the experiment was very high, with 
participants remembering almost all information about the learning candidates in both 
conditions, Mrule = 99.2, SD = 2.1, Msim = 99.1, SD = 1.7, t(48) = 0.12, p = .90, d = .03, 
independent of the strategy they used. 
3.2.2. Analyses of Fixations 
To analyze if similarity influenced eye movements we first defined rectangular AOIs 
around the eight exemplar locations in the same way as in Study 1. All AOIs were of the 
same size (5.5° by 6° of visual angle). These nonoverlapping AOIs exceeded the exemplar 
locations by approximately 1.5° of visual angle in each direction.  As in Study 1, we excluded 
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all trials where the dwell criterion was not met (6.5% of all trials). Then we aggregated 
durations of fixation on the exemplar locations depending on their similarity to the test 
candidate in a given trial for each participant. Unlike in Study 1, in Study 2 more than one 
exemplar location contained cue values identical to cue values of learning or test candidates. 
More precisely, for the eight test candidates who were identical to the learning candidates 
(old test items), one exemplar location contained an identical cue profile, three exemplar 
locations contained one identical cue, and four exemplar locations contained no identical 
cues. For the 20 new test candidates (new test items), one or two exemplar locations 
contained two identical cue values, two to four exemplar locations contained one identical 
cue, and three or four locations contained no identical cue values. Thus for the old test items, 
the exemplar locations shared 0, 1, or 3 cue values with the test candidates and for the new 
items the exemplar locations shared 0, 1, or 2 cue values with the new test items. As in Study 
1, we analyzed mean duration of fixation on the exemplar locations separately for the old and 
new items and for Test Phases 1 and 2 (see Figures 5 and 6). F values in statistical analyses 
were Greenhouse–Geisser corrected when necessary.  
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Figure 5. Mean duration of fixation on exemplar locations sharing 0 to 3 cue values 
with old test items for the rule condition (a, c) and the similarity condition (b, d) by strategy 
classification (rule user, similarity user) and test phase (Test Phase 1 spontaneous use: a, b; 
Test Phase 2 strategy instruction: c, d). Error bars show standard errors. 
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Figure 6. Mean duration of fixation on exemplar locations sharing 0 to 2 cue values 
with new test items for the rule condition (a, c) and the similarity condition (b, d) by strategy 
classification (rule user, similarity user) and test phase (Test Phase 1 spontaneous use: a, b; 
Test Phase 2 strategy instruction: c, d). Error bars show standard errors. 
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Test Phase 1. In a first step, we analyzed effects of strategy condition and strategy 
classification on duration of fixation on exemplar locations when judging the old items for 
Test Phase 1. We assumed that if exemplar retrieval takes place, participants should have 
fixated on AOIs that contained identical cue values during learning. First, we tested whether 
mean duration of fixation on exemplar locations differed between participants classified as 
rule or similarity users in the rule condition of Test Phase 1 (Figure 5a). A mixed ANOVA 
with the within-subject factor exemplar similarity (0, 1, 3) and the between-subjects factor 
strategy classification (rule or similarity user) revealed that overall, similarity users looked 
longer at the exemplar locations than rule users, as shown by a main effect of strategy 
classification, F(1, 24) = 4.87, p = .037, ηp
2
 = .17. Furthermore, a main effect of exemplar 
similarity suggests that participants looked longer at the exemplar location associated with the 
identical learning candidate than at the other exemplar locations, F(1, 24.8) = 21.74, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .48. Finally, similarity and rule users differed in the degree to which they looked back at 
the locations of similar learning candidates, as shown by a significant interaction between 
exemplar similarity and strategy classification, F(1, 24.8) = 5.05, p = .033, ηp
2
 = .17. In 
particular, similarity users clearly gazed more often at exemplar locations that were 
associated with the identical learning candidate than rule users did, t(24) = 2.29, p = .015, d = 
.93. 
Second, we tested whether similarity users in the similarity condition also looked 
longer at the identical learning candidates (Figure 5b). Indeed, an ANOVA for repeated 
measures testing the factor exemplar similarity revealed a significant effect for exemplar 
similarity, F(1, 20.9) = 23.13, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .54, suggesting that participants in the similarity 
condition looked much more frequently at the location of the identical learning candidate than 
at the other exemplar locations. Last, a test to determine if similarity users in the rule 
condition differed from similarity users in the similarity condition showed no difference, as 
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indicated by no main effect for condition, F(1, 31) = 1.14, p = .295, ηp
2
 = .04, and no 
interaction between condition and exemplar similarity, F(1, 32.2) = 0.85, p = .433, ηp
2
 = .03.  
Test Phase 2. We repeated the same set of analyses for Test Phase 2. As illustrated in 
Figure 5c, we still found a main effect for exemplar similarity, indicating that participants in 
the rule condition looked longer at the location of the identical learning candidate than at the 
other exemplar locations, F(1, 24.7) = 10.77, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .31. However, in Test Phase 2, 
participants classified as rule users no longer differed from participants classified as similarity 
users, as indicated by the lack of a main effect for strategy classification, F(1, 24) = 0.01, p = 
.906, ηp
2
 = 0, and no interaction between exemplar similarity and strategy classification, F(1, 
24.7) = 0.76, p = .927, ηp
2
 = 0. This suggests that after being instructed to use a rule, 
participants changed their strategy according to the instructions. In the similarity condition, 
the effect of exemplar similarity on fixation durations persisted in Test Phase 2, F(1, 20.2) = 
40.01, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .67 (Figure 5d). Last, in Test Phase 2 we found that participants 
originally classified as similarity users in the rule condition showed a smaller exemplar 
similarity effect than similarity users in the similarity condition, as shown by a significant 
main effect for the strategy condition, F(1, 31) = 11.04, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .26, and an interaction 
between strategy condition and exemplar similarity, F(1, 31.5) = 10.73, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .26.  
3.2.2.2. Mean fixation durations for new items 
Test Phase 1. Next, we tested if the effect of exemplar similarity also existed for the 
new test items that shared 0, 1, or 2 cue values with the learning candidates. As with the old 
items, we first tested whether similarity users differed from rule users in the rule condition 
(Figure 6a). Similar to what we found for the old items, similarity users looked more at the 
exemplar locations than did rule users, F(1, 24) = 5.33, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .18, and overall fixation 
durations increased with exemplar similarity, F(1.1, 26.7) = 11.69, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .33. 
Furthermore, a significant interaction between exemplar similarity and strategy classification 
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indicates that similarity users differed from rule users in the degree to which they looked back 
at the locations of similar learning candidates, F(1.1, 26.7) = 6.16, p = .017, ηp
2
 = .20. 
Whereas exemplar similarity did not play a role for the rule users, F(1, 13) = 2.34, p = .15, ηp
2
 
= .15, similarity users gazed more at the locations of the learning candidates the more cue 
values these shared with the test candidates, F(1, 11) = 9.19, p = .011, ηp
2
 = .45. 
In the same vein, we found that similarity users in the similarity condition also looked 
more at the exemplar locations of similar learning candidates than at the locations of learning 
candidates that had different cue values, F(1.3, 26.6) = 13.01, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .39 (Figure 6b). 
Similarity users in the similarity condition and similarity users in the rule condition did not 
differ significantly from each other, as indicated by the lack of a main effect for condition, 
F(1, 31) = 2.10, p = .159, ηp
2
 = .06, and a nonsignificant interaction between condition and 
exemplar similarity, F(1.2, 37.4) = 1.63, p = .213, ηp
2
 = .05. 
Test Phase 2. We repeated the same analyses for Test Phase 2. As shown in Figure 6c, 
we did not find an effect for exemplar similarity, F(2, 48) = 0.81, p = .453, ηp
2
 = .03, or 
strategy classification, F(1, 24) = 0.24, p = .878, ηp
2
 = .00, nor an interaction between these 
two factors in the rule condition, F(2, 48) = 0.51, p = .603, ηp
2
 = .02. Participants almost did 
not look at exemplar locations, regardless of their classification as rule or similarity user. In 
contrast, we still found an effect of exemplar similarity in the similarity condition, F(1.2, 
23.0) = 26.10, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .57 (Figure 6d). 
Last, we compared participants classified as similarity users in the rule and similarity 
conditions. Whereas similarity users in the similarity condition looked more at the exemplar 
locations of similar learning candidates than the locations of learning exemplars with 
different cue values, similarity users in the rule condition did not look back at the exemplar 
locations of similar learning candidates. This gaze pattern is confirmed by the results of a 
mixed ANOVA that showed a main effect for the factor strategy condition, F(1, 31) = 12.48, 
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p = .001, ηp
2
 = .29, and a significant interaction between the factors exemplar similarity and 
strategy condition, F(1.3, 38.0) = 13.99, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .31. 
3.3. Discussion of Study 2 
Overall, we found a similar pattern of results to that in Study 1. Participants using a 
similarity-based strategy showed a strong effect of similarity on eye movements. They looked 
more frequently at locations where identical but also where similar exemplars to the 
candidate under consideration had been presented. This was the case when participants were 
not instructed to use a specific strategy as well as when instructed to rely on similarity. 
Furthermore, the same effect appeared for all participants classified as using similarity, 
independent of whether they had received feedback inducing a similarity-based strategy. 
 As in Study 1 participants classified as using a rule or instructed to use a rule did not 
look back at the locations of similar exemplars. However, in contrast to Study 1, we found a 
memory effect when the same candidates appeared during test that had been studied 
previously. Here we found that even participants instructed to use a rule looked more 
frequently at the location where the specific candidate had appeared before. This indicates 
that when it was not necessary to use a rule because a specific candidate was recognized, 
participants relied on memory retrieval, but not when new candidates were evaluated. 
Possibly this effect did not appear in Study 1 because there the ―identical‖ candidates 
appeared with new names during test, whereas they had the same names in Study 2, which 
could have induced recognition regardless of the strategy they used.  
We were only partly able to induce participants to use a rule- or similarity-based 
strategy. Participants’ self-reports showed that also in the rule feedback condition a 
considerable number of participants used similarity. These results are in contrast to studies 
showing that usually people prefer simple rules to similarity (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; 
Erickson et al., 1998; Hoffmann et al., in press; Nosofsky et al., 1994). However, our studies 
Running Head: TRACK SIMILARITY 
 
 38 
differed from these experiments, because usually the information about the candidate does 
not need to be retrieved from memory. In contrast, in our task participants had to learn the 
rule while retrieving the cue values from memory. Indeed, Platzer and Bröder (2013) showed 
that in memory-based decisions people more frequently rely on similarity—in particular if the 
cue polarity (i.e., which cue value is associated with a positive outcome) is not known. In our 
task, learning about the direction of a cue was even more complex because every cue could 
take on four values compared to two cue values in the experiment by Platzer and Bröder 
(2013).  
In the analysis, we classified participants based on verbal descriptions of the strategies 
they used. The ability to verbalize is frequently considered a feature of rule application, 
whereas similarity-based strategies are often considered implicit and thus less accessible to 
deliberate reporting. Thus, similarity users might be less able to accurately report the strategy 
they used (Ashby et al., 1998; Ashby & Maddox, 2005). Indeed, participants who reported 
using a rule were easily classified and rater agreement was very high, reaching 100% for 
participants classified as using a simple rule. The majority of similarity users could be clearly 
classified as using similarity based on their description, but because similarity might be 
difficult to verbalize we included participants who were unable to verbalize the strategy they 
used in the similarity user category. However, we cannot rule out that these participants 
actually followed a different strategy, combined a rule-based and a similarity-based strategy, 
or switched strategies between trials. Overall, our results suggest that the gaze pattern of these 
participants reflects retrieval processes caused by similarity. Future research, however, should 
investigate if there are differences between people who rely on a single strategy and those 
who use multiple strategies as well as possible differences between participants who have 
insight into the strategies they used and participants who do not. Furthermore, researchers 
disagree on the degree to which self-reports reflect people’s actual cognitive processes versus 
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only general beliefs about how they made a decision (e.g., Harries, Evans, & Dennis, 2000; 
Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 2006). This suggests that future research should use 
additional methods such as cognitive modeling to corroborate our findings. 
4. General Discussion  
When making everyday decisions from memory people can apply abstract rules that 
process the available information for a decision or they can make a decision according to 
similar decision situations encountered in the past (Ashby et al., 1998; Erickson et al., 1998; 
Juslin & Persson, 2002; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Platzer & Bröder, 2013). Although this 
distinction is intuitively appealing it proves hard to separate on a process level. One reason is 
that the two processes are conceptually difficult to distinguish (Hahn & Chater, 1998; 
Markman et al., 2005; Pothos, 2005). Another problem is that hardly any tools exist that can 
trace memory processes during higher-level mental processes that are not intrusive and can 
measure the ongoing memory processes online (e.g., Bröder, 2000; Peterson & Beck, 2011).  
In two studies we explored memory processes during similarity- versus rule-based 
retrieval processes using a recently developed method based on the measurement of eye 
movements (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012). We found that participants 
using a similarity-based strategy differed in their eye movements from participants using a 
rule-based strategy: Whereas participants using similarity fixated on spatial locations that 
were associated with exemplars during learning, participants using a rule did not look back at 
the locations of the previously learned exemplars. This was the case when applying a 
complex rule based on multiple cues (Study 1) as well as a simple one-dimensional rule 
(Study 2), when applying similarity based on matches to four exemplars with unique cue 
values (Study 1) as well as when applying similarity to eight exemplars with each cue value 
associated with two exemplars (Study 2), and when instructed to use a strategy (Study 1) as 
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well as when selecting a strategy spontaneously (Study 2).
3
 In sum, these results provide 
robust evidence that participants using a similarity-based strategy retrieved exemplar 
information from memory, whereas participants who used a rule to arrive at a decision did not 
retrieve exemplar information from memory.  
4.1. Using Eye Movements to Study Memory Retrieval in Decision Making 
In both studies we found that people showed differences in eye movements depending 
on the retrieval demands of the decision strategy they employed. These results are in line with 
the idea that eye movements to associated spatial locations can be seen as direct evidence for 
memory retrieval, and the results dovetail with an ever-growing number of papers showing 
that when retrieving information from memory, people gaze back at spatial locations that 
have been associated with the to-be-retrieved information during encoding (e.g., Hoover & 
Richardson, 2008; Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; Richardson & Kirkham, 
2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000).  
In addition, our findings support the idea that eye movements do not reflect an 
automatic response that is executed upon listening to a statement probing associated spatial 
information, but rather a strategy-based retrieval process (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & 
Jahn, 2012). If eye movements are the result of an automatic link between perception and 
retrieval, rule users should have shown the same pattern of eye movements as similarity 
users, because listening to cue information should have automatically activated the episodic 
memory trace and triggered eye movements back to the associated spatial locations. Instead, 
rule user did not look back at these locations. This view is in line with findings in diagnostic 
reasoning where gaze behavior has been shown to reflect the activation status of a hypothesis 
                                                 
3
 To test memory processes during similarity- and rule-based decision making we 
analyzed mean fixation durations. The results are also robust when analyzing the proportion 
of the total decision time in one trial spent fixating on each location. 
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in memory (Jahn & Braatz, 2014). Here, we demonstrated that this research can be extended 
to study how eye movements reflect the memory processes involved in similarity- and rule-
based decision and judgment processes.  
In our study people’s eye movements were free and unrestricted. Recent research, 
however, suggests that triggering the eyes to move to a specific location during retrieval can 
enhance the retrieval of the information associated with that location (Johansson et al., 2012; 
Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Scholz, Mehlhorn, & Krems, 2014). 
Similarly, manipulating the salience of cues (Platzer & Bröder, 2012) and guiding the eyes 
toward valid and invalid cue information (Platzer, Bröder, & Heck, 2014) have been shown to 
influence the probability with which the cues are retrieved from memory and the resulting 
decision strategy. This suggests that guiding eye movements to locations could be a subtle 
way to alter the decision-making process, even if these locations no longer contain any 
information. However, with unrestricted eye movements, enhanced retrieval accuracy due to 
eye movements to associated but emptied spatial locations is unlikely (cf. Richardson et al., 
2009; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004). 
4.2. Memory Retrieval in Rule-based and Similarity-based Decisions 
We found in both studies that people using a rule did not look back at the locations of 
previously learned exemplars, but people using a similarity-based strategy did, independent 
of the complexity of the task structure and if the strategy was instructed or spontaneously 
used. This suggests that similarity-based and rule-based decisions rely on different memory 
processes. These results are in line with the assumptions of Hahn and Chater (1998; see also 
Bailey, 2005), who proposed that the core difference between rule and similarity lies not in 
the nature of the mental representations that are built, but in the way memory representations 
of stored information are matched with a novel object. Whereas similarity users make a 
decision by matching the object under consideration against the stored exemplars, rule users 
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compare the object against the conditions for choosing a specific option specified by the rule. 
Correspondingly, we found that only participants using similarity returned their gaze to the 
locations associated with exemplars, even though we made sure that rule and similarity users 
had the same information available in memory: Similarity and rule users received the same 
cue information about job candidates and we ensured that they were equally able to retrieve 
this information throughout the decision-making phase. Furthermore, a memory check at the 
end of Study 2 showed that participants remembered almost all the cue information and that 
there was no difference in recall accuracy between users of similarity- and rule-based 
strategies.  
Eye movements suggest that for participants using a similarity-based strategy, 
memory retrieval was a direct function of similarity with similar exemplars being fixated on 
more than nonsimilar exemplars. This idea is in line with multiple-trace models of memory 
such as the MINERVA model, which assumes that recall is a function of similarity to the 
object under consideration and the frequency and recency with which it was encountered 
during learning (Hintzman, 1988; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). In our study, frequency and 
recency were the same for all exemplars, leaving the effect of similarity. However, our results 
suggest that using eye movements to trace memory retrieval could be a promising avenue to 
investigate how frequency and recency interact with similarity when retrieving information. 
Overall, the differences between rule and similarity users were somewhat more 
pronounced when they followed instruction than when we compared participants who were 
classified based on their verbal reports. This suggests that the memory processes involved in 
an explicit and deliberate application of a strategy are comparable to the processes triggered 
by spontaneous use. However, a considerable number of participants were unable to verbalize 
the strategy they used, and it is possible that this is the result of using a combination of 
similarity and rule-based processes (e.g., Brooks & Hannah, 2006; Hahn et al., 2010; von 
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Helversen, Herzog, & Rieskamp, 2014). Here, making retrieval processes visible by tracing 
eye movements during the decision phase could be a valuable tool to analyze the memory 
processes involved in spontaneous decisions. 
5. Conclusion 
By observing eye movements while people performed memory-based decisions using 
a similarity-based or a rule-based strategy, we showed that the two strategies involve different 
memory processes. Although similarity and rule users had built the same memory 
representations, they differed in how these representations were accessed when making a 
decision. Whereas similarity users retrieved information about similar exemplars, rule users 
did not—providing empirical evidence that the two processes can be disentangled on the 
process level. Our results show that observing peoples’ eye movements to ―nothing‖ can 
make cognitive processes visible that otherwise would be hidden from sight. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 
Item Structure in Study 1  
Test 
candidate 
no. 
Cue 1: 
Language  
skills 
Cue 2: 
Computer  
skills 
Cue 3:  
Work 
experience 
Exemplar 
location (no. 
cues shared) 
Strategy prediction 
Rule Similarity 
1 Italian SQL Automobile 3 Invited Invited 
2 French SPSS Finance 3 Invited Invited 
3 French SQL Finance 3 Invited Invited 
4 Italian SPSS Finance 3 Invited Invited 
5 French SPSS Mobile phone 2 Invited Invited 
6 Italian HTML Automobile 2 Invited Invited 
7 Portuguese HTML Finance 1 Invited Rejected 
8 French Photoshop Mobile phone 1 Invited Rejected 
9 Spanish HTML Mobile phone 0 Invited Rejected 
10 Portuguese HTML Mobile phone 0 Invited Rejected 
11 Portuguese HTML Pharmaceutical 0 Rejected Rejected 
12 Spanish Photoshop Mobile phone 0 Rejected Rejected 
13 Spanish Photoshop Pharmaceutical 0 Rejected Rejected 
14 Portuguese Photoshop Mobile phone 0 Rejected Rejected 
15 Portuguese HTML Automobile 1 Rejected Rejected 
16 Spanish SPSS Mobile phone 1 Rejected Rejected 
17 Spanish SQL Automobile 2 Rejected Invited 
18 Italian Photoshop Automobile 2 Rejected Invited 
19 French SPSS Automobile 3 Rejected Invited 
20 Italian SPSS Automobile 3 Rejected Invited 
Note. Exemplar location indicates number of corresponding cue values with the invited 
learning candidates. Strategy prediction indicates if a test candidate was invited or rejected 
according to the rule or similarity instruction. Italic type denotes test candidates who had cue 
patterns identical to those of the learning candidates (identical test items). Test Candidates 1 
and 2 correspond with invited learning candidates and Candidates 11 and 12 with rejected 
learning candidates. All remaining test candidates varied in their similarity to the invited 
learning candidates (new test items).  
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Table A.2 
Item Structure in Study 2 
Test 
candidate 
no. 
Cue 1: 
Language 
skills 
Cue 2: 
Computer  
skills 
Cue 3:  
Work  
experience 
Strategy prediction 
Rule Similarity 
1 French SPSS Automobile Invited Rejected 
2 French SQL Mobile phone Invited Rejected 
3 French SPSS Mobile phone Invited Rejected 
4 French Photoshop Mobile phone Invited Invited 
5 French SPSS Financial Invited Invited 
6 French HTML Financial Invited Ambiguous 
7 French Photoshop Financial Invited Invited 
8 Italian SQL Automobile Invited Invited 
9 Italian SPSS Automobile Invited Ambiguous 
10 Italian HTML Automobile Invited Invited 
11 Italian SQL Pharmaceutical Invited Invited 
12 Italian HTML Pharmaceutical Invited Rejected 
13 Italian Photoshop Pharmaceutical Invited Rejected 
14 Italian HTML Financial Invited Rejected 
15 Spanish SPSS Automobile Rejected Ambiguous 
16 Spanish SQL Pharmaceutical Rejected Invited 
17 Spanish SPSS Pharmaceutical Rejected Invited 
18 Spanish Photoshop Pharmaceutical Rejected Ambiguous 
19 Spanish SQL Mobile phone Rejected Rejected 
20 Spanish SQL Financial Rejected Rejected 
21 Spanish SPSS Financial Rejected Invited 
22 Portuguese HTML Automobile Rejected Invited 
23 Portuguese Photoshop Automobile Rejected Rejected 
24 Portuguese Photoshop Pharmaceutical Rejected Rejected 
25 Portuguese SQL Mobile phone Rejected Ambiguous 
26 Portuguese HTML Mobile phone Rejected Invited 
27 Portuguese Photoshop Mobile phone Rejected Invited 
28 Portuguese HTML Financial Rejected Ambiguous 
Note. Strategy prediction indicates if a test candidate was invited according to the received 
strategy feedback (rule or similarity). According to the similarity feedback, six test candidates 
were equally similar to an invited and a rejected learning candidate and were classified as 
ambiguous. Italics denote test candidates who corresponded in their cue patterns with the 
eight learning candidates (old items). According to the rule feedback, candidates with the 
numbers 3, 7, 8, and 12 were invited and candidates number 17, 20, 23, and 26 were rejected. 
According to the similarity feedback, candidates number 7, 8, 17, and 26 were invited and 
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candidates number 3, 12, 20, and 23 were rejected. All other test candidates varied in their 
similarity with the learning candidates (new items). 
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Table A.3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Response Accuracy (%), Response Times (seconds) and 
Fixation Durations (seconds) on Exemplar Locations for Old and New Test Items and Test 
Phases 1 and 2 for the Seven Participants in the Similarity Condition in Study 2 Who Either 
Used a Rule (Participants 1–3) or Reported Using a Different Strategy (Participants 4–7) 
Participant 
no. 
Response 
accuracy 
Response  
time 
Exemplar location (no. cues shared) 
0 1 2/3 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Old items 
Test Phase 1  d         
1 100 0 9.2 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.3 2.4 
2 86 38 22.4 14.9 0.2 0.2 1.1 1 3.4 3.8 
3 100 0 9 0.6 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 
4 75 46 9.3 1.7 0 0 0 0.1 3.3 1.8 
5 100 0 9.2 1.3 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 
6 88 35 10.2 3.7 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.1 2.3 1.8 
7 100 0 9 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 
Test Phase 2           
1 100 0 9.1 1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.9 1.6 
2 67 52 12.5 8.8 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 2.6 4.7 
3 100 0 8.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0 0 
4 63 52 8.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 3.9 0.7 
5 100 0 9.1 1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.6 3.7 
6 100 0 10.1 2.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 5 1.8 
7 88 35 8.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.7 
New items 
Test Phase 1           
1 90 31 10.6 2.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.1 
2 73 46 27.8 16.4 0.7 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.6 
3 90 31 11.9 2.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 
4 75 44 8.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.8 
5 80 41 15.9 6 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.2 0.8 
6 75 44 11.6 3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0.7 1.1 
7 70 47 9.1 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 
Test Phase 2           
1 90 31 12.7 6.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.2 0.9 
2 89 32 13 8.4 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.4 
3 90 31 10.6 2.5 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
4 75 44 10.5 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.9 1 
5 90 31 22.7 17.5 0.1 0.1 1.2 2.9 1.4 4.8 
6 65 49 13 5 0.4 0.6 1.5 0.9 1.8 1.6 
7 70 47 11.1 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 
Note. Old items shared 0, 1, and 3 cue vales with exemplars and new items shared 0, 1, and 2 
cue values with exemplars. 
Highlights  
 
 We study differences in similarity- and rule-based processes using eye movements.  
 Using rule- and similarity-based strategies induces different gaze patterns. 
 Gaze patterns show that exemplars are retrieved from memory when using similarity. 
 No exemplars are retrieved when using a rule-based process. 
 Eye movements can be used to study memory processes in decision making. 
Highlights (for review)
